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Abstract
The main research question of this empirical work is whether or not globalization,
in its various forms, has had an impact upon international risk sharing. The empirical
literature so far has only investigated on one aspect of globalization: economic and
nancial integration. By decomposing globalization in its economic, political and
social aspects, and using a standard framework of consumption insurance tests to
gauge the extent of risk sharing among countries, we obtain some interesting results.
One of the main ndings is that economic and social integration help better cope
with idiosyncratic risk, but also that without political integration this might result
in an increasing exposure to systemic (uninsurable) risk.
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1 Introduction and literature
The globalization process is a controversial issue. The economic literature has been in-
vestigating (theoretically and empirically) into its consequences (in terms of risk sharing,
composition of government expenditure, contagion eects etc.) on the global economy
(and on the economy of groups of countries) reaching dierent results and conclusions.
Recently, a growing number of contributions argue in favor of a negative impact of glob-
alization. Dreher et al. (2008) nd no eect of several measures of globalization on the
composition of government expenditure. Koster (2008) claims that social security transfers
have increased less in countries with a higher level of social openness and that the welfare
state is not aected by political openness. Stiglitz (2010) tries to provide a general frame-
work to analyze the optimal degree of nancial integration, highlighting the undesirabilityof a complete integration among countries. Mendoza and Quadrini (2009) attempt to un-
cover the contribution of increased nancial integration to the surge in debt in the US and
its inuence on the spillover of the crisis across countries. Kose et al. (2009) conclude that
only industrial countries have benetted from improvements in risk sharing in the recent
period of globalization, arguing towards the existence of a threshold level of integration,
beyond which countries start appreciating a positive impact of nancial globalization on
consumption insurance. In addition, they warn about the inuence of other country spe-
cic characteristics which, despite the increased level of nancial integration, may preclude
the possibility of improvements in risk sharing. Prociclicality of net capital inows is a
further reason singled out by the empirical literature (Kaminsky et al. (2004)) as a cause
of inability to attain the expected benets of nancial integration. The empirical and
theoretical literature on risk sharing moved in two dierent directions. A rst strand of
the literature has been investigating the eects of the documented1 increase in nancial
integration on international risk sharing; another, more recent strand is exploring (theoret-
ically and empirically) the role of social networks among individuals (and households) on
consumption insurance (e.g. Fafchamps and Lund (2003); De Weerdt (2004); Bramoull e
and Kranton (2007); Ambrus et al. (2010); Fafchamps (2011); Bloch et al. (2008)). We
will focus on the rst strand, but before reviewing the most inuential contributions might
be helpful to stress two things. First, risk sharing itself can work as a measure of nancial
integration since measurements of the degree of risk sharing are given by comparison with
the benchmark case of fully integrated markets. Recent contributions have documented,
at a global level, that countries have accumulated cross border holdings and enlarged the
size of their external portfolio over the last twenty years (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)).
Moreover the European monetary unication, with the introduction of a common currency,
has produced a unique case of study which is perfectly suitable to investigate the impact
of nancial integration. These two issues have probably channeled the scholars' interest
predominantly towards that aspect of globalization which is nancial integration. The liter-
ature we explore next tries to understand whether the degree of risk sharing actually tracks
some of nancial integration indices. About nancial integration, the empirical literature
is strongly divided. Part of it claims an increased degree of risk sharing starting from the
early 1990s, arguing that this has been driven by improvements in market integration due to
globalization (see Giannone and Reichlin (2006) and Sorensen et al. (2007)). On the same
line Leibrecht and Scharler (2008) realize that countries whose foreign asset and liability
position is below the average, experience a shorter mean lag of adjustment, meaning that
consumption reacts more rapidly to income shocks, while countries that are characterized
by above average foreign asset and liability positions have a much higher mean lag of ad-
justment. Conversely, other empirical contributions are unable to document improvements
in risk sharing. Some calls for the existence of a threshold mechanism: improved nancial
integration does not guarantee per se a rise in the degree of risk sharing or the presence of
risk pooling (for instance, Bai and Zhang (2004)). Others impute this failure of detecting
an augmented degree of insurance to standard regression tests which exploit data at busi-
1see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
2ness cycle frequency, strengthening the link between consumption and output volatility
(e.g. Artis and Homann (2007)). Kose et al. (2003) suggest that risk sharing rises at
an intermediate level of nancial integration, while it falls at higher levels of integration.
Kose et al. (2007) nd very weak links between nancial globalization and risk sharing,
over the period 1960-2004, and for the two subsamples 1960-1986 (pre-globalization) and
1987-2004 (globalization). However, on the shorter globalization sample, only developed
countries seem to have reaped some benets from nancial globalization in term of risk
sharing, whereas the subset of emerging economies does not seem to have been aected,
at least in a statistically signicant way. On the other hand, Kose et al. (2003) nd that
\nancial openness, as measured by gross capital ows as a ratio to GDP, is associated
with an increase in the ratio of consumption volatility to income volatility, contrary to the
notions of improved international risk-sharing opportunities through nancial integration".
Broner and Ventura (2011) claim that even though globalization may increase demand for
insurance, we might observe a decline in the availability of insurance because globalization
is also conducive to other underlying frictions, such as sovereign risk.
Our aim in this work is to assess the eects of various aspects of globalization on interna-
tional risk sharing. The empirical literature, so far, has mainly focused on a single measure
of globalization, i.e. nancial and trade integration, leaving out of the investigation (vir-
tually) all other aspects of integration. We will try to ll this gap in the literature and end
up with the conjecture that nancial integration, alone, might not be sucient to produce
positive eects on consumption smoothing. Social and political integration turn out to
be also necessary. The next section reviews some interesting measures of globalization;
section 3 describes the empirical strategy we use in our analysis, and relate it to the rest
of the literature. Our estimation results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes,
with nal remarks.
2 A composite index of globalization
Globalization is a multi faceted phenomenon. That is why it may be inappropriate to
reduce it only to its nancial dimension. Moreover, as it should be clear from the previous
section, virtually all contributions dealing with risk sharing and globalization have done so
by focussing on the nancial, economic and trade aspects. The main research question of
this work is therefore whether or not other dimensions of globalization have exerted any
role in shaping the risk sharing opportunities enjoyed by countries, and in particular its
political and cultural sides. To explore this issue we need a more comprehensive dataset,
covering all these aspects, in addition to the standard ones. A.T.Kearney (2007) , Dreher
(2006) and Dreher et al. (2008) provide such datasets. In its earlier releases, the former
was possibly the rst dataset to include several dimensions (fourteen variables measuring
economic integration, technological connectivity and political engagement, for a large set of
countries). However, the scores obtained on the basis of those variables are only available
for a few, and rather recent, years. The latter, on the other hand, combines 23 variables
3related to economic, social and political integration, to generate three sub indices, which
are in turn aggregated in an overall index, for a very large number of countries (208) and
a time horizon of several years (1970-2007 for the countries with the largest availability
of data). The three sub-indices concern, respectively, the economic, political and social
sides of globalization. Economic integration is measured both by actual ows (trade, for-
eign direct investments, portfolio investments, income payments to foreign nationals and
capital employed) and by restrictions on trade and capital, measured by hidden import
barriers, mean tari rates, taxes on international trade and capital controls. Political glob-
alization is proxied by such variables as the number of embassies in a country, the number
of international organizations and the number of UN peace missions participated by the
country. Social globalization, the hardest to pin down, is proxied by data on personal con-
tacts (international tourism, internet users, number of radios, telephone calls and telephone
costs, foreign population), data on information ows (telephone mainlines, internet hosts,
internet users, cable television users, daily newspapers and radios), and data on cultural
proximity (the number of McDonald's restaurants per capita, the number of Ikea outlets
per capita, and trade in books, as a percentage of GDP). The rationale for combining
these 23 variables into three indices is given by their being largely collinear, which makes
it virtually impossible to use all of them in isolation for regression purposes. That the three
dimensions of globalization tell a (sometimes very) dierent story is shown by table 1, fea-
turing the Spearman rank correlation index among the rankings obtained with respect to
economic, social, political and overall globalization, for those countries possessing data on
all those dimensions in 2000, and the coecients of correlation between the time series of
economic, social and political globalization, for all countries with available data, in levels
and in delta logs. A quick inspection of table 1 reveals that average correlations among
the three indices are not particularly large (with mean values of about 0.73, 0.61 and 0.63
respectively), and become extremely small when we look at their yearly rates of growth
(with mean values of about 0.04, -0.004 and 0.06). On the other hand, the Spearman
correlations among the rankings obtained by the various forms of globalization is always
smaller than 0.79. These results seem to suggest that the three indices, and even more
the corresponding sub indices, convey dierent pieces of information, which could be lost
if one only looked at one dimension of globalization, or only at their overall summary index.
3 Globalization and risk sharing: the empirical strat-
egy
Under the hypothesis of complete markets economic theory predicts full insurance (per-
fect consumption smoothing across time and states of nature).2 Consider two endowment
economies: a domestic and a foreign country with one homogeneous tradable good, two
periods and two states of nature. Representative agents are identical and can access a
2See Obstfeld and Rogo (1996) for a complete description of the model.
4complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities. Agents are risk averse and with Constant Rel-
ative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences. The solution of this simple model allows all
individuals in home and foreign countries to equate their marginal rates of substitution
between current consumption and state contingent future consumption to the same state
contingent security prices. If marginal utility growth is equalized across countries, the
correlation between domestic and foreign per capita consumption growth is perfect (or
high) even though countries' discount factors might be dierent. Consumption is then
internationally diversied in the sense that the only type of risk reected by consumption
is due to aggregate uncertainty in world output (systemic risk). This means that, in this
framework, domestic consumption growth should not be aected by idiosyncratic risk. An
empirical counterpart of this strong theoretical prediction is given by a test regression of
the following type 3, rst proposed by Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991);
logcit =  + ISit + log(Cat) + it (1)
where ISit an idiosyncratic shock variable (usually proxied by domestic output growth
from which the world output growth is subtracted in order to account for common shocks
to income); logcit is the rate of growth of domestic consumption for country i at time
t and logCat is the rate of growth of aggregate consumption. Under the null of perfect
(idiosyncratic) risk sharing  should equal zero, while  should be high or equal to 1,
under the assumption of identical risk aversion coecients among agents. Crucini (1999)
and Crucini and Hess (1999) stress stringent assumptions underlying the model and its
predictions. In particular, they highlight that those theoretical predictions rely on the
possibility of contract enforcement at zero cost and emphasize that individuals pool risk
to the extent of equating benets and costs. This idea is formalized using a permanent
income model for varying degrees of income pooling. Permanent income is dened as a
weighted average of individual permanent income and per capita permanent income of
others engaged in risk sharing. These weights are given by the fraction of income stream
that individuals pool to share risk. Crucini's methodology nests Mace's test specication
with small changes.
logcit = ilog(Cat) + (1   i)log(yit) + it (2)
For  = 1 risk is perfectly shared and consumption changes (log(cit)) co-move perfectly
with aggregate consumption changes (log(Cat)). If  = 0 agents do not share risk and
consumption changes are perfectly correlated to revisions in permanent income log(yit)4
assuming innovations to log permanent income proxied by changes in income (Crucini and
Hess (1999)). For 0 <  > 1 risk sharing is not complete and this incompleteness is deter-
mined by the fraction of income stream that agents devote to risk sharing pool.
3An alternative empirical approach studies consumption and output correlations in order to prove the
economic prediction of the model in an international business cycle framework (among others: Devereux
et al. (1992); Tesar (1993); Obstfeld (1994); Stockman and Tesar (1995)).
4This is a  weighted average of changes in individual permanent income and changes in permanent
income of the group of individuals sharing risk.
5The hypothesis of complete risk sharing has been extensively tested empirically at house-
hold level and with panels of countries. The empirical literature, with the exception of
very few contributions (e.g. Mace (1991) and Lewis (1997)), has pervasively documented
rejections of the null hypothesis of complete risk sharing. However, intra-nationally agents
seem to be able to better cope with idiosyncratic risk than inter-nationally: this evidence is
mainly due to the presence of income smoothing through the scal channel which is almost
absent with international data 5 (e.g. Asdrubali et al. (1996); Sorensen and Yosha (1998);
Crucini (1999)). For example, Sorensen and Yosha (2000) prove that geography can aect
the ability to share risk. They estimate income and consumption smoothing within and
between regions in the US and show that more overall risk sharing occurs within than
between regions: risk sharing through saving seems to be more a local phenomenon. From
these contributions come out how geographical, cultural and political proximity as well as
personal contacts and information ows boost agents to insure against shocks to income.
Besides that, nancial integration facilitates diversication of risk through the access to a
wider range of insurance possibilities.
The most common specication of macroeconomic risk sharing regression tests is due to
Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Sorensen and Yosha (1998) (respectively ASY and SY hereafter)
who use the following regressions:
log(cit)   log(Cat) = const + (log(yit)   log(yat)) + it (3)
where log(yit) is country i GDP growth rate and log(yat) is the average GDP growth
rate of the reference area (which captures common shocks to income). Here,  is the un-
smoothed part of risk, since it represents co-movements with idiosyncratic income and argue
that (1 ) can be interpreted as the degree of insurance achieved by internal and external
channels. In fact, theory predicts that the higher the degree of international risk sharing,
the smaller the co-movements between relative consumption and relative income. Melitz
and Zumer (1999) (MZ in the sequel) revise ASY's approach by adding some structure to 
so that  = 0+1zi where zi is an interaction variable aecting the degree of international
risk sharing that a country obtains and which, according to ASY's interpretation, is equal
to 1 0 1zi. Kose et al. (2007) and Kose et al. (2011) interact idiosyncratic income with
a measure of nancial openness with the aim of understanding and measuring the impact
of nancial globalization on international risk sharing, and estimate the following equation:
log(cit)   log(Cat) = const + 0(log(yit)   log(yat))+
+ 1FOi(log(yit)   log(yat)) + it (4)
where the degree of risk sharing achieved by country i is equal to 1   0   1. A negative
interaction term (1) implies that nancial openness has a positive impact on international
risk sharing or, equivalently, a negative one on co-movements between state specic risk and
domestic relative consumption. Sorensen et al. (2007) modify the empirical methodology
5This point has been rst outlined in a early work due to Sachs and Sala-i Martin (1992).
6introduced by MZ allowing  to change over time (running year by year cross sectional
regressions) and introducing a time trend in order to control for downward trends in the
interaction variable (namely, home bias and nancial integration measures), which might
capture changes in the trend of risk sharing imputable to other developments in nancial
markets. In this framework,  in equation 3 is then modelled as
 = 0 + 1(t    t) + 2(EHBit   EHBt): (5)
 t is the median value of the trend variable, EHBit is a measure of equity home bias and
EHBt represents its mean. Our empirical strategy is mainly based on these contributions
(Asdrubali et al. (1996); Sorensen and Yosha (1998); Melitz and Zumer (1999); Crucini
(1999); Crucini and Hess (1999); Kose et al. (2007); Kose et al. (2011); Sorensen et al.
(2007)) but we depart from them in several ways. First, we do not constrain  in equation
(1) to be equal to 1, privileging a test specication similar to that used in the pioneering
contribution by Mace (1991) (equation 1), and an interpretation of the estimated results  a
la Crucini (1999), and Crucini and Hess (1999). Secondly, we interact globalization indices
with both idiosyncratic income and aggregate consumption growth as a way to quantify
the extent of the impact of globalization on the ability of countries to deal with both
idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. Third and foremost, we do not focus almost exclusively
on nancial integration as a source of larger insurance opportunities, but explore the role
of economic integration6 as well as several other aspects of social and political integration.
Our estimated test equation is the following:
log(c
i
t) =  + 0(log(yit)   log(yat)) + 1(GIit   GIt)(log(yit)   log(yat)+




 = 0 + 1(GIit   GIt) (7)
 = 0 + 1(GIit   GIt) (8)
where GIit is a globalization index which might be an overall index or several indices
(and sub-indices) for economic, social and political globalization (see section 2). 1 and
1 are expected to be negative and represent the impact of these aspects of globalization
on co-movements between domestic consumption growth and idiosyncratic and systemic
risk. Our panel analysis allows for heteroskedasticity by using Generalized Least Square
(GLS), and individual dummies are included. We do not include in equation (6) controls
 a la Levine and Renelt (1992), usually included in cross-country growth regressions, as we
do not search for linkages between average growth rates in consumption and other factors
(for instance, social and institutional factors).
6For example, the elimination of barriers to trade and nancial ows
74 Estimation results
Table 2 and 3 report some descriptive statistics for the globalization indices; as expected,
EMU and OECD countries show a remarkable higher level of globalization than other
groups of countries (e.g., LAC, SAS and SSA). Table 4 and 5 contain estimation results
for two sets of countries: OECD and non-OECD7. Mean values for economic, social and
political integration (indices a, b and c) have been computed for the two groups (table (3)).
Equation (1) has been estimated for any possible combination of indices. More precisely, we
estimated equation (1) splitting (for instance) OECD countries in subgroups with respect
to their level of integration. Column (1) and (2) in table 4 report consumption insurance
test for countries with a level of integration (economic, social and political) respectively
above (column 1) and below (column 2) the average level of integration achieved by OECD
countries, whereas column (3) displays test results for a panel of countries, among OECD
members, above the average in terms of economic integration, but below the average in
terms of social and political integration. This has been done to gauge dierences in risk
sharing across countries with levels of integration below or above the average. Were these
dierences remarkable, we might conjecture the presence of a threshold level of integration
which, once exceeded, brings about a tangible increase in the degree of risk sharing. One
of the most interesting results of our analysis is revealed by columns (3) and (9) in table 4.
Subgroups of countries (within OECD and non-OECD sets of countries) above the average
in terms of economic and cultural integration, but below the average in terms of political
integration, feature the lowest value of the estimated coecient on idiosyncratic GDP, de-
noting a particularly high level of insurance. However, the coecient attached to the rate
of growth of aggregate consumption is well above unity (1.28) for OECD countries, while
reaching a stunning value of 2.32 for non-OECD countries. Let us stress the fact that a
very small value of  goes with an unusually large value of , which can be interpreted as
an over-reaction of domestic to aggregate consumption growth. In other words, countries
characterized by levels of economic and social integration above the group's mean, and by
a level of political integration below the average, seem to be more able to cope with id-
iosyncratic risk (displaying a rather small estimated coecient on relative income growth),
but to be (much) more exposed to aggregate (systemic) risk, uninsurable by denition. For
this group of countries an aggregate negative shock is more expensive in terms of contrac-
tion of domestic consumption growth. Analyzing the \symmetric" case, where economic
integration is below the average while social and political integration are above the average
(for OECD countries column (4) in table 4), we observe a value of 0.65 for the estimated
coecient attached to idiosyncratic GDP, and a coecient on aggregate consumption ap-
proaching unity (0.92). It is worth comparing this result with column (1) where, on top of
social and political integration, economic integration is above the average. We can see that
a larger than average level of economic integration (once political and social integration
are also above their cross country mean values) seems to play no or little role in reducing
7See the appendix for a complete list of countries. Data on income and consumption are from World
Bank and are expressed in real terms and per capita values.
8the sensitivity of relative domestic consumption growth to relative income growth. On the
contrary, it produces a large reaction of consumption changes to aggregate risk ( exceeds
unity).
Table 5 presents the results of a similar exercise as in table 4, but using rates of growth
of globalization indices, which might be taken to proxy the speed of convergence to full
integration. In the light of previous results, it is not surprising to detect that the best
results (in terms of domestic consumption changes to idiosyncratic risk and in terms of
response of domestic to aggregate consumption growth) are achieved by those groups of
countries (column (6) and (12)) characterized by above the average rates of growth in
political integration, and by rates of growth of social and economic integration below the
average. Summing up, results in table 4 and 5 are highly suggestive of the importance
of political integration. Economic integration (in particular nancial markets integration)
can widen viable insurance opportunities; nevertheless the elimination of barriers to trade
and nancial ows, if it is not accompanied by an equally important process of political
integration, (for instance in the form of numbers of diplomatic relations which may pro-
mote agreements on international contract enforcement), might have a destabilizing eect
on countries' economies, which can better diversify idiosyncratic risk, but become more
\fragile" with respect to systemic risk and more exposed to contagion eects.
Table 6 displays estimation results for equation (6) for the whole set of countries and for
several groups economically and/or geographically related. Along with the whole time sam-
ple we considered two subsamples (1970-1989 and 1990-2007) in order to identify possible
changes in the eects of the integration process on risk sharing for pre and post global-
ization periods. In table 6 the interaction term is given by an overall index of integration
which encompasses all aspects of integration. In six (seven for subsamples 1970-1989 and
1990-2007) out of ten cases, the interaction term produces a positive eect (i.e., have a
negative sign) on risk sharing, reducing reactions of the rate of growth of domestic con-
sumption to idiosyncratic shocks. A similar impact is exerted on aggregate consumption
growth: globalization reduces co-movements between domestic and aggregate consumption
growth. Table 7, 8, and 9 display results including three interaction variables: economic,
social and political integration, while in table 10, 11 and 12 interaction terms are given by
subcomponents of integration indices in order to understand which measure of integration
(within the three main indices) determines improvements in consumption smoothing.
On the whole sample (between 1970 and 2007) we detect the prominent role of economic
integration in buering the eect of idiosyncratic risk on consumption. Political integration
plays the same role on aggregate consumption. Once again, we are led to formulate the
intuitively appealing conjecture that economic integration helps buering domestic con-
sumption growth against idiosyncratic shocks while political integration helps in reducing
reactions of domestic consumption growth with respect to aggregate shocks.
At a closer look at table 10, where sub-indices are considered, we observe for OECD, EMU
and LAC countries that the positive eect of economic integration (previously revealed
in table 7) is mainly due to actual ows (ai), while quite surprisingly information ows
(bii) signicantly exacerbate responses of domestic consumption growth to relative income.
95 Concluding remarks
The eects of globalization on international risk sharing are far from clear. There is mixed
evidence in the empirical literature as to whether we should expect an increase in risk
sharing and in consumption insurance due to the recent surge in nancial integration.
This might be partly due, in our opinion, to the fact that only the economic dimensions
of globalization have been taken into account. Social, cultural and political aspects of
globalization should also be considered, to get a clearer and more realistic picture. Just
to give an example of the way political globalization might have an inuence in shaping
international risk sharing opportunities, it suces to recall that sovereign wealth funds
(SWF), government managed investment funds, have gained a tremendous momentum in
the last few years, and are expected to continue growing. According to some recent es-
timates by IMF (2008a) and IMF (2008b), SWF's are currently controlling some 2 to 3
trillion USD in asset value worldwide, and are expecting to reach 10 trillion USD in the
next few years, which exceeds the market capitalization of even large European economies.
Although many such funds strive to convey the impression that their investments are led
solely by nancial and economic considerations, we cannot reject the hypothesis that some
of the investments are also led by political considerations (political proximity, strategic
trades, etc.). That political globalization does have a role in determining countries ex-
posure to aggregate and idiosyncratic risks is the main empirical result of our work, as
we showed that both economic and political integration is necessary in order to maximize
full insurance opportunities. This is an interesting result, but more empirical research is
needed to get an insight as to the actual, non economic, channels of risk sharing.
6 Appendix. List of countries
Eastern Asia and Pacic (EAP)
Cambodia (KHM), China (CHN), Fiji (FJI), Indonesia (IDN), Kiribati (KIR), Korea
(KOR), Laos (LAO), Malaysia (MYS), Mongolia (MNG), Papua New Guinea (PNG),
Philippines (PHL), Samoa (WSM), Salomon (SLB), Thailand (THA), Tonga (TON), Van-
uatu (VUT), Vietnam (VNM).
Eastern and Continental Asia (ECA)
Albania (ALB), Armenia (ARM), Azerbaijan (AZE), Byelorussia (BLR), Bosnia Herzegov-
ina (BIH), Bulgaria (BGR), Georgia (GEO), Kazakhstan (KAZ), Kirghizstan (KGZ), Lee-
tonia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU), Macedonia (MKD), Moldavia (MDA), Montenegro (MNE),
Poland (POL), (ROM), Russia (RUS), Tajikistan (TJK), Turkey (TUR), Turkmenistan
(TKM), Ukraine (UKR), Uzbekistan (UZB).
European Monetary Union (EMU)
Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL) Germany (DEU), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France
(FRA), Greece (GRC), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NLD), Portugal (PRT).
Latin American and Caribbean (LAC)
10Argentina (ARG), Antigua and Barbuda (ATG), Bahamas (BHS), Belize (BLZ), Bolivia
(BOL), Brazil (BRA), Barbados (BRB), Chile (CHL), Colombia (COL), Costa Rica (CRI),
Cuba (CUB), Dominica (DMA), Dominican Republic (DOM), Ecuador (ECU), El Sal-
vador (SLV), Grenada (GRD), Guatemala (GTM), Guyana (GUY), Haiti (HTI), Hon-
duras (HND), Jamaica (JAM), Mexico (MEX), Nicaragua (NIC), Panama (PAN), Porto
Rico (PRI), Paraguay (PRY) Peru (PER), Saint Christopher and Nevis (KNA), Santa
Lucia (LCA), San Vincent and Grenadine (VCT), Suriname (SUR), Trinidad and Tobago
(TTO), Uruguay (URY), Venezuela (VEN).
Middle East and North Africa (MNA)
Algeria (DZA), Djibouti (DJI), Egypt (EGY), Kuwait (KWT), Iran (IRN), Jordan (JOR),
Lebanon (LBN), Libya (LBY), Morocco (MAR), Oman (OMN), Qatar (QAT), Saudi Ara-
bia (SAU), Singapore (SGP), Syria (SYR), Tunisia (TUN), Turkey (TUR), United Emi-
rates (ARE).
New European Countries (NEC)
Estonia (EST), Czech Republic (CZE), Croatia (HRV), Leetonia (LVA), Moldavia (MDA),
Macedonia (MKD), Montenegro (MNE), Poland (POL), Russia (RUS), Serbia (SRB), Slo-
vakia (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Ukraine (UKR).
OECD countries (OECD)
Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Switzerland (CHE),
Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Great
Britain (GBR), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Ireland (IRL), Iceland (ISL), Italy (ITA),
Japan (JPN), Korea (KOR), Mexico (MEX), Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), New
Zealand (NZL), Portugal (PRT), Sweden (SWE), United States (USA).
South Asia (SAS)
Bangladesh (BGD), Bhutan (BTN), India (IND), Maldives (MDV), Nepal (NPL), Pakistan
(PAK), Sri Lanka (LKA).
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
Angola (AGO), Benin (BEN), Botswana (BWA), Burkina Faso (BFA), Burundi (BDI),
Cameron (CMR), Cape Verde (CPV), Central Africa (CAF), Chad (TCD), Comore (COM),
(ZAR), Congo (COG), Ivory Coast (CIV), Ethiopia (ETH), Gabon (GAB), Gambia (GMB),
Ghana (GHA), Guinea (GIN), Guinea Bissau (GNB), Kenya (KEN), Lesotho (LSO),
Madagascar (MDG), Malawi (MWI), Mali (MLI), Mauritania (MRT), Mauritius (MUS),
Mozambique (MOZ), Namibia (NAM), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGA), Rwanda (RWA), Sao
Tom e and Principe (STP), Senegal (SEN), Seychelles (SYC), Sierra Leone (SLE), Soma-
lia (SOM), South Africa (ZAF), Sudan (SDN), Swaziland (SWZ), Tanzania (TZA), Togo
(TGO), Uganda (UGA), Zambia (ZMB), Zimbabwe (ZWE).
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15Table 1: Spearman rank correlation index and coecients of correlation
Panel a) Spearman rank correlation index
Rank EG Rank EG Rank SG Rank PG
Correlation coecient 1 0.79 0.29
valid cases 141 141 141
one-sided signicance 0 0 0
Rank SG
Correlation coecient 0.79 1.00 0.44
valid cases 141 141 141
one-sided signicance 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rank PG
Correlation coecient 0.29 0.44 1
valid cases 141 141 141
one-sided signicance 0 0 0
Rank OG
Correlation coecient 0.86 0.93 0.61
valid cases 141 141 141
one-sided signicance 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel b) Coecients of correlation between the time series of economic, social and political globalization, for all countries
Levels of integration
Mean 0.7350 0.6071 0.6376
Std. Dev. 0.3621 0.3557 0.3346
Rates of growth of integration
Mean 0.0422 -0.0046 0.0605
Std. Dev. 0.1928 0.1503 0.1965
EG, SG, PG and OG correspond to economic, social, political and overall globalization
16Table 2: Descriptive statistics by group
World ECA
Variable Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Economic (a) 5143 48.934 18.825 9.083 98.897 601 50.936 12.073 24.796 84.101
Actual ows (ai) 5358 50.022 21.161 4.935 100 601 46.579 15.174 14.279 88.991
Restrictions (aii) 4991 49.448 23.224 5.387 97.705 601 56.523 13.027 30.708 88.444
Social (b) 6875 40.198 20.787 2.697 95.006 753 38.999 12.809 19.87 77.244
Personal contact (bi) 6609 48.753 23.608 3.759 97.47 753 43.62 12.008 22.285 73.124
Information ows (bii) 6799 48.66 23.06 1 98.511 715 51.103 19.554 12.767 94.384
Cultural proximity (biii) 6875 22.797 25.683 1 97.237 753 20.196 19.972 1 85.686
Political (c) 6837 47.897 25.631 1.279 98.778 715 36.503 28.311 5.19 94.63
Overall Index (oi) 6647 44.249 17.268 9.048 93.811 715 41.066 13.709 15.364 81.258
OECD EMU
Variable Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Economic (a) 988 66.493 16.328 26.348 98.897 456 70.849 16.344 39.999 98.897
Actual ows (ai) 988 56.498 22.645 11.112 100 456 60.303 24.803 17.966 100
Restrictions (aii) 988 77.188 13.625 32.612 97.705 456 82.353 8.721 63.674 97.705
Social (b) 988 66.023 17.667 22.447 95.006 456 66.104 16.966 30.947 92.77
Personal contact (bi) 988 68.74 14.804 30.161 94.744 456 72.612 10.959 48.394 94.744
Information ows (bii) 988 71.874 15.63 32.142 98.511 456 72.179 16.216 37.856 98.511
Cultural proximity (biii) 988 56.476 32.395 1.614 95.584 456 52.383 33.971 2.719 94.248
Political (c) 988 81.021 14.688 31.588 98.778 456 83.341 14.154 45.769 98.778
Overall Index (oi) 988 69.874 14.102 26.12 93.811 456 72.073 12.835 46.591 93.382
LAC MNA
Variable Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Economic (a) 928 46.775 14.402 13.216 87.135 418 48.093 19.422 14.188 97.476
Actual ows (ai) 893 51.533 18.705 6.518 95.201 570 47.55 19.916 5.521 99.26
Restrictions (aii) 928 41.95 16.314 5.387 87.916 456 50.633 24.442 18.653 96.101
Social (b) 1270 42.283 12.786 13.158 74.084 646 44.731 18.25 17.435 94.078
Personal contact (bi) 1194 50.197 21.33 15.506 93.575 646 58.756 21.823 17.733 94.59
Information ows (bii) 1270 54.295 16.057 19.672 94 646 51.98 17.546 18.32 94.534
Cultural proximity (biii) 1270 22.596 16.486 1 50.856 646 22.576 27.639 1 97.237
Political (c) 1270 49.16 21.253 3.793 93.38 646 54.545 18.116 8.821 93.393
Overall Index (oi) 1232 45.21 9.818 18.87 73.735 646 48.417 13.429 21.653 88.95
EAP NEC
Variable Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Economic (a) 456 48.766 13.201 18.287 77.868 285 57.712 14.813 24.796 92.619
Actual ows (ai) 418 53.619 21.837 4.935 91.884 285 53.482 18.216 14.279 94.388
Restrictions (aii) 380 42.054 13.58 18.932 74.475 323 62.513 13.395 33.984 94.43
Social (b) 646 28.756 14.549 7.064 75.49 323 55.078 13.822 28.676 84.011
Personal contact (bi) 608 33.22 18.53 8.304 67.156 323 60.658 11.097 35.15 80.314
Information ows (bii) 646 37.007 17.588 8.345 80.48 285 65.817 20.899 23.486 96.432
Cultural proximity (biii) 646 14.986 18.416 1 87.371 323 37.782 25.715 1 91.501
Political (c) 646 40.282 21.217 8.154 88.233 285 48.804 29.585 6.299 94.63
Overall Index (oi) 646 36.719 12.737 15.877 77.946 285 54.952 15.374 29.422 86.87
SAS SSA
Variable Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Economic (a) 190 24.014 9.814 11.382 50.485 1368 37.026 14.473 9.083 77.223
Actual ows (ai) 190 32.53 17.941 11.717 69.686 1330 41.922 19.524 5.964 95.742
Restrictions (aii) 190 24.958 10.714 11.048 56.914 1254 31.951 16.152 5.436 73.597
Social (b) 266 22.286 11.881 6.923 52.392 1672 24.031 11.2 4.365 66.79
Personal contact (bi) 266 32.263 15.492 12.464 63.344 1596 34.291 17.357 7.25 81.173
Information ows (bii) 266 26.756 17.996 4.27 86.983 1672 31.423 16.629 1 88.856
Cultural proximity (biii) 266 8.042 9.431 1 33.796 1672 6.728 5.315 1 44.575
Political (c) 266 47.704 24.027 9.771 92.693 1672 44.042 17.429 4.244 90.24
Overall Index (oi) 266 29.64 8.924 13.185 52.689 1634 33.445 9.279 15.811 68.285
17Table 3: Mean values. OECD and non-OECD countries
Variables OECD NON OECD
GDP per capita 18278.06 3028.513
Consumption per capita 10354.87 1353.268
GDP per capita (growth rate) 0.0233 0.0154
Consumption per capita (growth rate) 0.0219 0.0167
Globalization Index (levels)
Economic (a)
Actual ows (ai) 56.5 49.26
Restrictions (aii) 77.19 43.79
Social (b) 66.02 36.89
Personal contact (bi) 68.74 46.06
Information ows (bii) 71.87 45.94
Cultural proximity (biii) 56.48 18.18
Political (c) 81.02 42.82
Overall Index (oi) 69.87 40.61
Globalization Index (growth rates)
Economic (a)
Actual ows (ai) 0.021 0.017
Restrictions (aii) 0.006 0.015
Social (b) 0.015 0.012
Personal contact (bi) 0.005 0.002
Information ows (bii) 0.011 0.018
Cultural proximity (biii) 0.055 0.022
Political (c) 0.007 0.027























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Table 6: Internation risk sharing and overall index of Globalization
70-07 World OECD LAC EAP ECA EMU MNA NEC SAS SSA
VARIABLES  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t
 log(yit)id 0:7354 0:7342 0:8319 0:7107 0:6812 0:7645 0:5211 0:8628 0:5963 0:7330
(0:0180) (0:0240) (0:0350) (0:0630) (0:0610) (0:0460) (0:0580) (0:0850) (0:1350) (0:0410)
(oiit   oit) log(yit)id  0:0017  0:0084 0:0388 0:0042  0:0114 0:0048  0:0135  0:0106 0:0153  0:0194
(0:0010) (0:0020) (0:0060) (0:0060) (0:0050) (0:0060) (0:0060) (0:0090) (0:0220) (0:0060)
 log(Cat) 0:8942 1:0397 0:7142 0:8429 1:2380 0:9961 0:7760 0:9225 0:8899 0:8316
(0:0230) (0:0370) (0:0430) (0:0670) (0:1010) (0:0420) (0:0920) (0:0940) (0:0750) (0:0790)
(oiit   oit) log(Cat) 0:0023  0:0044 0:0177 0:0009  0:0236 0:0013  0:0087  0:0295 0:0103 0:0107
(0:0010) (0:0030) (0:0080) (0:0040) (0:0080) (0:0050) (0:0120) (0:0110) (0:0150) (0:0080)
Constant 0:0095  0:0093 0:0034  0:0185 0:0780 0:0012 0:0345  0:0101  0:0220 0:0150
(0:0530) (0:0050) (0:0240) (0:0230) (0:0340) (0:0050) (0:0280) (0:0160) (0:0080) (0:0540)
Observations 3637 900 801 293 293 406 301 173 104 1025
Number of id 129 25 26 10 18 11 13 12 4 35
70-89 World OECD LAC EAP ECA EMU MNA NEC SAS SSA
VARIABLES  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t
 log(yit)id 0:6966 0:7371 0:8048 0:6025 0:6812 0:7819 0:4322 0:8628 0:6663 0:7581
(0:0250) (0:0330) (0:0540) (0:0790) (0:0610) (0:0660) (0:0890) (0:0850) (0:1910) (0:0500)
(oiit   oit) log(yit)id  0:0005  0:0020 0:0577 0:0116  0:0114 0:0030  0:0254  0:0106 0:0153  0:0311
(0:0010) (0:0030) (0:0100) (0:0090) (0:0050) (0:0080) (0:0120) (0:0090) (0:0340) (0:0080)
 log(Cat) 0:7982 1:0391 0:6686 0:5129 1:2380 0:9893 0:8688 0:9225 0:9115 0:6219
(0:0310) (0:0460) (0:0590) (0:1000) (0:1010) (0:0610) (0:1330) (0:0940) (0:0830) (0:1290)
(oiit   oit) log(Cat) 0:0063 0:0009 0:0119  0:0323 0:0236 0:0010 0:0121  0:0295 0:0822 0:0373
(0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0140) (0:0110) (0:0080) (0:0080) (0:0210) (0:0110) (0:0410) (0:0180)
Constant  0:1336  0:0075 0:0112 0:0200 0:0780  0:0038 0:0165  0:0101 0:0052  0:0087
(0:1500) (0:0040) (0:0310) (0:0170) (0:0340) (0:0080) (0:0160) (0:0160) (0:0150) (0:0450)
Observations 1530 475 365 133 293 209 104 173 41 450
Number of id 94 25 22 7 18 11 8 12 3 31
90-07 World OECD LAC EAP ECA EMU MNA NEC SAS SSA
VARIABLES  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t
 log(yit)id 0:8034 0:7321 0:9438 0:6003 0:6812 0:6450 0:6698 0:8628 0:3388 0:7264
(0:0240) (0:0360) (0:0430) (0:1280) (0:0610) (0:0610) (0:0670) (0:0850) (0:1730) (0:0630)
(oiit   oit) log(yit)id  0:0032 0:0230 0:0104 0:0234  0:0114  0:0238  0:0080  0:0106 0:0893  0:0030
(0:0010) (0:0030) (0:0060) (0:0100) (0:0050) (0:0100) (0:0080) (0:0090) (0:0400) (0:0080)
 log(Cat) 0:9480 1:0518 0:8139 0:8802 1:2380 0:9252 0:7205 0:9225 0:3432 0:8866
(0:0300) (0:0780) (0:0580) (0:0830) (0:1010) (0:0620) (0:1110) (0:0940) (0:1730) (0:0860)
(oiit   oit) log(Cat)  0:0015  0:0262 0:0129  0:0016  0:0236 0:0083  0:0276  0:0295 0:0863 0:0104
(0:0020) (0:0080) (0:0080) (0:0070) (0:0080) (0:0080) (0:0150) (0:0110) (0:0240) (0:0070)
Constant 0:0476  0:0261 0:0034 0:0307 0:0780 0:0066 0:0422  0:0101 0:0044  0:0150
(0:0490) (0:0060) (0:0220) (0:0140) (0:0340) (0:0030) (0:0280) (0:0160) (0:0100) (0:0210)
Observations 2107 425 413 153 293 186 189 173 60 544
Number of id 129 25 26 10 18 11 13 12 4 35
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors reported in brackets.
Estimated equation:
 log(ci
t) =  + 0 log(yit)id+1(oiit   oit) log(yit)id+0( log(Cat)) + 1(oiit   oit)( log(Cat)) + i
t
where:  log(yit)id = ( log(yit)    log(yat))
21Table 7: International risk sharing and economic, social and political globalization between
70-07
World OECD LAC EAP ECA EMU MNA NEC SAS SSA
VARIABLES  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t
 log(yit)id 0:6958 0:7233 0:8500 0:6375 0:6831 0:7679 0:4167 0:9388 0:6683 0:6909
(0:0230) (0:0250) (0:0540) (0:1180) (0:0580) (0:0430) (0:1020) (0:0920) (0:3670) (0:0480)
(ait   at) log(yit)id  0:0055 0:0080 0:0028  0:0062  0:0020  0:0200 0:0009 0:0069  0:0908  0:0080
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0040) (0:0070) (0:0070) (0:0050) (0:0090) (0:0100) (0:0540) (0:0050)
(bit   bt) log(yit)id 0:0009  0:0021 0:0191 0:0075 0:0161 0:0163 0:0128 0:0013 0:0412  0:0101
(0:0010) (0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0080) (0:0060) (0:0040) (0:0090) (0:0100) (0:0360) (0:0060)
(cit   ct) log(yit)id 0:0026 0:0017 0:0101 0:0032  0:0034 0:0012 0:0064  0:0125 0:0132 0:0030
(0:0010) (0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0060) (0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0060) (0:0040) (0:0100) (0:0030)
 log(Cat) 0:8921 1:0591 0:7158 0:6978 1:1959 1:0233 0:8929 0:9861 1:6870 0:8380
(0:0340) (0:0390) (0:0780) (0:1280) (0:1090) (0:0460) (0:2620) (0:1120) (0:2730) (0:0880)
(ait   at) log(Cat) 0:0026 0:0021 0:0013  0:0107 0:0070 0:0055  0:0070  0:0184  0:0027 0:0110
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0060) (0:0070) (0:0090) (0:0040) (0:0140) (0:0100) (0:0240) (0:0070)
(bit   bt) log(Cat) 0:0004  0:0039 0:0113 0:0011 0:0014  0:0041 0:0006 0:0110 0:0106  0:0057
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0060) (0:0050) (0:0090) (0:0030) (0:0150) (0:0170) (0:0120) (0:0090)
(cit   ct) log(Cat) 0:0009  0:0017 0:0060 0:0056  0:0029  0:0041  0:0055  0:0178 0:0285 0:0050
(0:0010) (0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0050) (0:0040) (0:0020) (0:0120) (0:0060) (0:0090) (0:0060)
Constant  0:0265  0:0089  0:0120 0:0099  0:0001 0:0027 0:0036 0:0199 0:0043  0:0274
(0:0360) (0:0050) (0:0100) (0:0110) (0:0230) (0:0010) (0:0180) (0:0180) (0:0090) (0:0350)
Observations 3342 900 720 286 276 406 271 173 95 874
Number of id 114 25 23 9 17 11 10 12 3 29
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors reported in brackets.
 log(ci
t) =  + 0 log(yit)id + 1(ait   at) log(yit)id + 2(bit   bt) log(yit)id + 3(cit   ct) log(yit)id + 0( log(Cat))+
+1(ait   at)( log(Cat)) + 2(bit   bt)( log(Cat)) + 3(cit   ct)( log(Cat)) + i
t
where:  log(yit)id = ( log(yit)    log(yat))
Table 8: International risk sharing and economic, social and political globalization between
70-89
World OECD LAC EAP ECA EMU MNA NEC SAS SSA
VARIABLES  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t
 log(yit)id 0:6635 0:7326 0:7694 0:6983 0:6831 0:7279 0:5260 0:9388 3:2387 0:7564
(0:0400) (0:0340) (0:1050) (0:1500) (0:0580) (0:0620) (0:1600) (0:0920) (2:3230) (0:0600)
(ait   at) log(yit)id  0:0054  0:0085 0:0079  0:0049  0:0020  0:0245 0:0117 0:0069  0:1145  0:0122
(0:0030) (0:0040) (0:0080) (0:0110) (0:0070) (0:0060) (0:0160) (0:0100) (0:1570) (0:0070)
(bit   bt) log(yit)id  0:0009 0:0035 0:0293 0:0001 0:0161 0:0193 0:0260 0:0013 0:2893  0:0171
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0090) (0:0160) (0:0060) (0:0050) (0:0160) (0:0100) (0:2570) (0:0090)
(cit   ct) log(yit)id 0:0035 0:0002 0:0204 0:0123  0:0034  0:0032  0:0200  0:0125 0:0182 0:0000
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0070) (0:0100) (0:0020) (0:0050) (0:0110) (0:0040) (0:0210) (0:0040)
 log(Cat) 0:7357 1:0573 0:6524 0:4150 1:1959 1:0932 1:3041 0:9861 4:2907 0:6008
(0:0590) (0:0500) (0:1350) (0:1870) (0:1090) (0:0700) (0:3770) (0:1120) (1:5790) (0:1470)
(ait   at) log(Cat) 0:0059 0:0049 0:0054  0:0056 0:0070 0:0158  0:0060  0:0184 0:0040 0:0249
(0:0030) (0:0050) (0:0080) (0:0110) (0:0090) (0:0070) (0:0240) (0:0100) (0:0810) (0:0130)
(bit   bt) log(Cat)  0:0018  0:0016 0:0037  0:0246 0:0014  0:0098 0:0248 0:0110 0:2437  0:0005
(0:0030) (0:0040) (0:0100) (0:0140) (0:0090) (0:0050) (0:0230) (0:0170) (0:1640) (0:0260)
(cit   ct) log(Cat) 0:0047  0:0013 0:0048  0:0027  0:0029  0:0079  0:0157  0:0178 0:0312 0:0084
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0080) (0:0130) (0:0040) (0:0040) (0:0200) (0:0060) (0:0150) (0:0140)
Constant 0:0170  0:0099  0:0195 0:0400  0:0001  0:0119  0:0032 0:0199  0:0385  0:0193
(0:0400) (0:0070) (0:0290) (0:0160) (0:0230) (0:0050) (0:0240) (0:0180) (0:0200) (0:0400)
Observations 1439 475 329 133 276 209 104 173 41 395
Number of id 86 25 19 7 17 11 8 12 3 26
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors reported in brackets.
Estimated equation:
 log(ci
t) =  + 0 log(yit)id + 1(ait   at) log(yit)id + 2(bit   bt) log(yit)id + 3(cit   ct) log(yit)id + 0( log(cat))+
+1(ait   at)( log(cat)) + 2(bit   bt)( log(cat)) + 3(cit   ct)( log(cat)) + i
t
where:  log(yit)id = ( log(yit)    log(yat))
22Table 9: International risk sharing and economic, social and political globalization between
90-07
World OECD LAC EAP ECA EMU MNA NEC SAS SSA
VARIABLES  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t
 log(yit)id 0:7641 0:7382 0:9009 0:5977 0:6831 0:7132 0:4687 0:9388 0:2366 0:6732
(0:0270) (0:0370) (0:0570) (0:1770) (0:0580) (0:0660) (0:1180) (0:0920) (1:3220) (0:0680)
(ait   at) log(yit)id  0:0038  0:0024  0:0082  0:0087  0:0020  0:0217 0:0063 0:0069  0:0523 0:0132
(0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0050) (0:0120) (0:0070) (0:0070) (0:0110) (0:0100) (0:0480) (0:0080)
(bit   bt) log(yit)id  0:0005  0:0176 0:0093 0:0170 0:0161 0:0098  0:0032 0:0013 0:0584  0:0186
(0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0040) (0:0080) (0:0060) (0:0110) (0:0090) (0:0100) (0:0450) (0:0080)
(cit   ct) log(yit)id 0:0031 0:0007 0:0048 0:0070  0:0034 0:0082 0:0165 0:0125 0:0333 0:0107
(0:0010) (0:0040) (0:0030) (0:0070) (0:0020) (0:0140) (0:0060) (0:0040) (0:0490) (0:0050)
 log(Cat) 0:9573 1:0370 0:8348 0:6632 1:1959 0:9386 0:7812 0:9861 1:3409 0:8182
(0:0410) (0:0830) (0:0790) (0:1760) (0:1090) (0:0620) (0:3200) (0:1120) (0:6720) (0:0980)
(ait   at) log(Cat)  0:0032  0:0125  0:0018  0:0169 0:0070  0:0014 0:0090  0:0184 0:0342 0:0114
(0:0020) (0:0080) (0:0050) (0:0080) (0:0090) (0:0070) (0:0140) (0:0100) (0:0240) (0:0070)
(bit   bt) log(Cat) 0:0022  0:0039 0:0144 0:0019 0:0014 0:0027  0:0327 0:0110 0:0396  0:0112
(0:0020) (0:0090) (0:0060) (0:0050) (0:0090) (0:0100) (0:0200) (0:0170) (0:0210) (0:0080)
(cit   ct) log(Cat)  0:0005  0:0134 0:0042 0:0083  0:0029 0:0080  0:0138  0:0178 0:0135 0:0123
(0:0020) (0:0070) (0:0040) (0:0060) (0:0040) (0:0130) (0:0120) (0:0060) (0:0240) (0:0050)
Constant 0:0037  0:0249 0:0045 0:0390  0:0001 0:0073 0:0090 0:0199 0:0032 0:0279
(0:0280) (0:0060) (0:0050) (0:0190) (0:0230) (0:0030) (0:0200) (0:0180) (0:0040) (0:0070)
Observations 1903 425 371 146 276 186 159 173 51 453
Number of id 114 25 23 9 17 11 10 12 3 29
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors reported in brackets.
Estimated equation:
 log(ci
t) =  + 0 log(yit)id + 1(ait   at) log(yit)id + 2(bit   bt) log(yit)id + 3(cit   ct) log(yit)id + 0( log(Cat))+
+1(ait   at)( log(Cat)) + 2(bit   bt)( log(Cat)) + 3(cit   ct)( log(Cat)) + i
t
where:  log(yit)id = ( log(yit)    log(yat))
23Table 10: International risk sharing and disaggregated measure of globalization (actual
ows, restriction, information ows, personal contacts, cultural proximity, political inte-
gration) between 70-07
World OECD LAC EAP ECA EMU MNA NEC SAS SSA
VARIABLES  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t
 log(yit)id 0:7012 0:7405 0:9151 0:7935 0:7144 0:7403 0:4390 0:8266 0:6342 0:7414
(0:0250) (0:0250) (0:0680) (0:1730) (0:0600) (0:0450) (0:1060) (0:0820) (0:6740) (0:0550)
(aiit   ait) log(yit)id  0:0017  0:0011  0:0035  0:0049  0:0054  0:0100 0:0040  0:0175  0:0689  0:0025
(0:0010) (0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0060) (0:0070) (0:0040) (0:0060) (0:0120) (0:0460) (0:0050)
(aiiit   aiit) log(yit)id  0:0003  0:0020 0:0040 0:0046 0:0006  0:0039 0:0045 0:0158 0:0191  0:0049
(0:0010) (0:0030) (0:0040) (0:0110) (0:0060) (0:0090) (0:0060) (0:0090) (0:0550) (0:0050)
(biit   bit) log(yit)id  0:0040 0:0102 0:0111 0:0001 0:0161  0:0013 0:0010  0:0088 0:0607  0:0014
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0040) (0:0110) (0:0080) (0:0080) (0:0070) (0:0070) (0:0450) (0:0060)
(biiit   biit) log(yit)id 0:0048 0:0044 0:0092 0:0096 0:0155 0:0141 0:0046 0:0322 0:0173  0:0042
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0040) (0:0090) (0:0060) (0:0050) (0:0080) (0:0080) (0:0670) (0:0040)
(biiiit   biiit) log(yit)id  0:0010 0:0003 0:0008  0:0046  0:0107 0:0039  0:0106  0:0092 0:0348 0:0261
(0:0010) (0:0010) (0:0030) (0:0050) (0:0040) (0:0020) (0:0050) (0:0040) (0:0270) (0:0150)
(cit   ct) log(yit)id 0:0016 0:0016 0:0114 0:0009  0:0012  0:0018 0:0110  0:0172 0:0028 0:0001
(0:0010) (0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0090) (0:0030) (0:0050) (0:0070) (0:0060) (0:0160) (0:0050)
 log(Cat) 0:9102 1:0394 0:6609 0:5767 1:2407 1:0271 1:2551 0:9748 2:5329 0:8497
(0:0390) (0:0420) (0:0990) (0:1660) (0:1150) (0:0470) (0:2880) (0:0960) (0:5060) (0:1090)
(aiit   ait) log(Cat)  0:0017  0:0010 0:0048  0:0067  0:0012 0:0031  0:0089 0:0074 0:0093 0:0058
(0:0010) (0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0050) (0:0080) (0:0030) (0:0090) (0:0110) (0:0140) (0:0080)
(aiiit   aiit) log(Cat) 0:0048 0:0045  0:0008 0:0005  0:0003 0:0079 0:0151  0:0236 0:0058 0:0037
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0040) (0:0080) (0:0070) (0:0070) (0:0100) (0:0080) (0:0230) (0:0070)
(biit   bit) log(Cat) 0:0006 0:0039  0:0027  0:0068  0:0068  0:0078  0:0117 0:0106 0:0568 0:0031
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0040) (0:0080) (0:0140) (0:0060) (0:0120) (0:0130) (0:0280) (0:0110)
(biiit   biit) log(Cat) 0:0014 0:0000 0:0078 0:0048 0:0113 0:0016 0:0188 0:0120  0:0010  0:0054
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0040) (0:0070) (0:0100) (0:0040) (0:0110) (0:0100) (0:0200) (0:0090)
(biiiit   biiit) log(Cat)  0:0020 0:0023 0:0022  0:0017  0:0070  0:0022  0:0015  0:0068 0:0071 0:0012
(0:0010) (0:0010) (0:0030) (0:0030) (0:0040) (0:0020) (0:0080) (0:0060) (0:0110) (0:0100)
(cit   ct) log(Cat)  0:0003  0:0032 0:0070 0:0071  0:0036  0:0027  0:0141  0:0150 0:0210  0:0013
(0:0010) (0:0020) (0:0050) (0:0070) (0:0050) (0:0030) (0:0140) (0:0060) (0:0110) (0:0080)
Constant  0:0034  0:0071  0:0140 0:0118 0:0032  0:0012 0:0001 0:0076  0:0189  0:0077
(0:0090) (0:0050) (0:0110) (0:0110) (0:0130) (0:0020) (0:0070) (0:0190) (0:0070) (0:0110)
Observations 3064 900 705 259 259 406 271 173 95 655
Number of id 103 25 22 7 16 11 10 12 3 22
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors reported in brackets.
Estimated equation:
 log(ci
t) =  + 0 log(yit)id + 1(aiit   ait) log(yit)id + 2(biit   bit) log(yit)id + 4(biiit   biit) log(yit)id + 5(biiiit   biiit) log(yit)id+
+6(cit   ct) log(yit)id + 0( log(Cat)) + 1(aiit   ait)( log(Cat)) + 2(aiiit   ait)( log(Cat)) + 3(biit   bit)( log(Cat))+
+4(biiit   biit)( log(Cat)) + 5(biiiit   biiit)( log(Cat)) + 6(cit   ct)( log(Cat)) + i
t
where:  log(yit)id = ( log(yit)    log(yat))
24Table 11: International risk sharing and disaggregated measure of globalization (actual
ows, restriction, information ows, personal contacts, cultural proximity, political inte-
gration) between 70-89
World OECD LAC EAP ECA EMU MNA NEC SAS SSA
VARIABLES  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t
 log(yit)id 0:7034 0:7261 0:8686 0:6210 0:7144 0:7319 0:2789 0:8266 15:2733 0:8040
(0:0430) (0:0360) (0:1220) (0:1770) (0:0600) (0:0640) (0:4200) (0:0820) (23:0110) (0:0740)
(aiit   ait) log(yit)id  0:0035  0:0046 0:0000  0:0081  0:0054  0:0127 0:0089  0:0175  0:1410  0:0151
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0050) (0:0080) (0:0070) (0:0060) (0:0100) (0:0120) (0:2200) (0:0080)
(aiiit   aiit) log(yit)id  0:0004  0:0039 0:0090 0:0085 0:0006  0:0112 0:0000 0:0158  1:1383  0:0134
(0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0090) (0:0320) (0:0060) (0:0120) (0:0200) (0:0090) (0:7580) (0:0060)
(biit   bit) log(yit)id  0:0026  0:0003 0:0135 0:0059 0:0161  0:0011  0:0081  0:0088 0:9920 0:0128
(0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0070) (0:0270) (0:0080) (0:0140) (0:0100) (0:0070) (0:3780) (0:0110)
(biiit   biit) log(yit)id 0:0027 0:0032 0:0092  0:0088 0:0155 0:0164  0:0081 0:0322  0:6135  0:0033
(0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0070) (0:0160) (0:0060) (0:0080) (0:0130) (0:0080) (0:9130) (0:0050)
(biiiit   biiit) log(yit)id 0:0008 0:0011 0:0037 0:0081  0:0107 0:0046  0:0202  0:0092 5:3610  0:0521
(0:0010) (0:0010) (0:0050) (0:0090) (0:0040) (0:0030) (0:0220) (0:0040) (4:0840) (0:0470)
(cit   ct) log(yit)id 0:0008 0:0004 0:0159  0:0085  0:0012  0:0085  0:0138  0:0172 0:0833  0:0155
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0080) (0:0120) (0:0030) (0:0060) (0:0150) (0:0060) (0:0720) (0:0070)
 log(Cat) 0:8211 1:0345 0:6092 0:4051 1:2407 1:0290 2:3208 0:9748  9:7676 0:8745
(0:0650) (0:0520) (0:1510) (0:1880) (0:1150) (0:0720) (0:5570) (0:0960) (9:4220) (0:2230)
(aiit   ait) log(Cat)  0:0028  0:0016 0:0099  0:0043  0:0012 0:0000  0:0110 0:0074  0:1200  0:0038
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0060) (0:0090) (0:0080) (0:0050) (0:0140) (0:0110) (0:1510) (0:0180)
(aiiit   aiit) log(Cat) 0:0091 0:0086  0:0020 0:0540  0:0003 0:0387 0:0405  0:0236 0:2971  0:0074
(0:0030) (0:0050) (0:0100) (0:0220) (0:0070) (0:0120) (0:0190) (0:0080) (0:2670) (0:0150)
(biit   bit) log(Cat)  0:0001 0:0013  0:0045  0:0438  0:0068  0:0078  0:0032 0:0106  0:1056 0:0412
(0:0030) (0:0050) (0:0070) (0:0240) (0:0140) (0:0090) (0:0180) (0:0130) (0:2720) (0:0290)
(biiit   biit) log(Cat) 0:0002 0:0061 0:0073  0:0097 0:0113 0:0022 0:0215 0:0120  0:1264  0:0019
(0:0020) (0:0050) (0:0060) (0:0130) (0:0100) (0:0070) (0:0150) (0:0100) (0:3940) (0:0190)
(biiiit   biiit) log(Cat)  0:0022  0:0023 0:0012 0:0046  0:0070  0:0047 0:0213  0:0068  2:8543  0:2155
(0:0010) (0:0010) (0:0050) (0:0060) (0:0040) (0:0020) (0:0280) (0:0060) (1:7170) (0:1300)
(cit   ct) log(Cat) 0:0003  0:0045 0:0092  0:0055  0:0036 0:0006  0:0228  0:0150 0:0249  0:0327
(0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0100) (0:0140) (0:0050) (0:0050) (0:0260) (0:0060) (0:0730) (0:0230)
Constant  0:0083  0:0090  0:0218 0:0337 0:0032 0:0041  0:0025 0:0076 0:0079 0:0247
(0:0460) (0:0070) (0:0290) (0:0180) (0:0130) (0:0040) (0:0220) (0:0190) (0:0040) (0:0300)
Observations 1343 475 329 133 259 209 104 173 41 299
Number of id 79 25 19 7 16 11 8 12 3 19
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors reported in brackets.
Estimated equation:
 log(ci
t) =  + 0 log(yit)id + 1(aiit   ait) log(yit)id + 2(biit   bit) log(yit)id + 4(biiit   biit) log(yit)id + 5(biiiit   biiit) log(yit)id+
+6(cit   ct) log(yit)id + 0( log(Cat)) + 1(aiit   ait)( log(Cat)) + 2(aiiit   ait)( log(Cat)) + 3(biit   bit)( log(Cat))+
+4(biiit   biit)( log(Cat)) + 5(biiiit   biiit)( log(Cat)) + 6(cit   ct)( log(Cat)) + i
t
where:  log(yit)id = ( log(yit)    log(yat))
25Table 12: International risk sharing and disaggregated measure of globalization (actual
ows, restriction, information ows, personal contacts, cultural proximity, political inte-
gration) between 90-07
World OECD LAC EAP ECA EMU MNA NEC SAS SSA
VARIABLES  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t  log ci
t
 log(yit)id 0:7387 0:7277 0:9477 0:7258 0:7144 0:6873 0:4804 0:8266 1:6876 0:7096
(0:0310) (0:0370) (0:0770) (0:4190) (0:0600) (0:0670) (0:1310) (0:0820) (1:7200) (0:0860)
(aiit   ait) log(yit)id 0:0025 0:0135 0:0066  0:0119  0:0054  0:0257 0:0028  0:0175  0:0007 0:0144
(0:0020) (0:0030) (0:0040) (0:0120) (0:0070) (0:0060) (0:0070) (0:0120) (0:0420) (0:0080)
(aiiit   aiit) log(yit)id  0:0006 0:0025  0:0058  0:0059 0:0006 0:0871 0:0030 0:0158 0:1468 0:0216
(0:0020) (0:0050) (0:0040) (0:0160) (0:0060) (0:0280) (0:0080) (0:0090) (0:0650) (0:0080)
(biit   bit) log(yit)id  0:0025  0:0338 0:0069 0:0095 0:0161 0:0246  0:0005  0:0088  0:0385  0:0131
(0:0020) (0:0060) (0:0040) (0:0140) (0:0080) (0:0130) (0:0110) (0:0070) (0:0570) (0:0100)
(biiit   biit) log(yit)id 0:0017 0:0021 0:0032 0:0169 0:0155 0:0029  0:0082 0:0322 0:0238  0:0193
(0:0020) (0:0050) (0:0050) (0:0140) (0:0060) (0:0090) (0:0130) (0:0080) (0:0610) (0:0090)
(biiiit   biiit) log(yit)id  0:0030 0:0030 0:0046  0:0137  0:0107 0:0053 0:0009  0:0092 0:0413 0:0205
(0:0010) (0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0090) (0:0040) (0:0040) (0:0050) (0:0040) (0:0220) (0:0170)
(cit   ct) log(yit)id 0:0043 0:0030 0:0058 0:0120  0:0012 0:0328 0:0170  0:0172 0:0346 0:0178
(0:0010) (0:0040) (0:0040) (0:0150) (0:0030) (0:0170) (0:0080) (0:0060) (0:0570) (0:0060)
 log(Cat) 0:9563 0:9785 0:8274 0:4350 1:2407 0:9254 0:5732 0:9748 3:9985 0:8856
(0:0490) (0:0850) (0:1130) (0:3690) (0:1150) (0:0600) (0:3850) (0:0960) (1:1550) (0:1210)
(aiit   ait) log(Cat)  0:0027  0:0083  0:0019  0:0090  0:0012 0:0090 0:0189 0:0074 0:0298 0:0097
(0:0020) (0:0050) (0:0050) (0:0090) (0:0080) (0:0040) (0:0130) (0:0110) (0:0160) (0:0090)
(aiiit   aiit) log(Cat)  0:0017  0:0166  0:0006  0:0070  0:0003  0:0427 0:0052  0:0236 0:0198 0:0107
(0:0020) (0:0080) (0:0040) (0:0100) (0:0070) (0:0170) (0:0120) (0:0080) (0:0270) (0:0090)
(biit   bit) log(Cat) 0:0052 0:0213 0:0089  0:0013  0:0068  0:0175  0:0438 0:0106 0:1114 0:0032
(0:0030) (0:0090) (0:0060) (0:0120) (0:0140) (0:0100) (0:0300) (0:0130) (0:0340) (0:0110)
(biiit   biit) log(Cat)  0:0022  0:0257 0:0018 0:0043 0:0113  0:0200  0:0057 0:0120 0:0227  0:0121
(0:0030) (0:0070) (0:0060) (0:0110) (0:0100) (0:0080) (0:0230) (0:0100) (0:0220) (0:0110)
(biiiit   biiit) log(Cat) 0:0011 0:0051 0:0095 0:0006  0:0070 0:0095 0:0041  0:0068 0:0177  0:0157
(0:0020) (0:0040) (0:0050) (0:0050) (0:0040) (0:0040) (0:0090) (0:0060) (0:0110) (0:0130)
(cit   ct) log(Cat)  0:0005  0:0082 0:0050 0:0111  0:0036  0:0111  0:0290  0:0150 0:0463 0:0115
(0:0020) (0:0070) (0:0050) (0:0130) (0:0050) (0:0130) (0:0180) (0:0060) (0:0360) (0:0070)
Constant 0:0005  0:0021 0:0077 0:0064 0:0032 0:0081 0:0046 0:0076  0:0147  0:0298
(0:0250) (0:0050) (0:0060) (0:0150) (0:0130) (0:0050) (0:0070) (0:0190) (0:0110) (0:0440)
Observations 1721 425 357 119 259 186 159 173 51 337
Number of id 103 25 22 7 16 11 10 12 3 22
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors reported in brackets.
Estimated equation:
 log(ci
t) =  + 0 log(yit)id + 1(aiit   ait) log(yit)id + 2(biit   bit) log(yit)id + 4(biiit   biit) log(yit)id + 5(biiiit   biiit) log(yit)id+
+6(cit   ct) log(yit)id + 0( log(Cat)) + 1(aiit   ait)( log(Cat)) + 2(aiiit   ait)( log(Cat)) + 3(biit   bit)( log(Cat))+
+4(biiit   biit)( log(Cat)) + 5(biiiit   biiit)( log(Cat)) + 6(cit   ct)( log(Cat)) + i
t
where:  log(yit)id = ( log(yit)    log(yat))
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